Latest Article
ModuleGuard: A Gatekeeper for Dynamic Module Loading Against Malware
DING Shuang1,2, FU Jianming1,2,3†, PENG Bichen1,2
1. School of Computer, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, Hubei, China; 2. State Key Laboratory of Aerospace Information Security and Trusted Computing, Ministry Education, Wuhan 430072, Hubei, China; 3. State Key Laboratory of Software Engineering, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, Hubei, China
 We analyze the attack steps of malware and focus on the malware loading. Our assumption is that a malware contains no less than one module, so monitoring module loading is indispensable to defeat malware. Moreover, we design security policies and employ these policies when a module is loaded by the operating system. These policies depend on properties of module, the connection to created modules, and the link to user intention. The properties of module and this connection can improve the accuracy of malware detection. User intention can be helpful to handle unknown module and enhances the flexibility of policy. Finally, ModuleGuard, a gatekeeper for dynamic module loading against malware, has been designed and implemented, which integrates these security policies. Our experimental results have shown the feasibility and effectiveness of our method. 
Key words: module; user intention; security polices; malware
CLC number: TP 311.5
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